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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This is an action for medical practice brought by Kenneth Thomson against Craig Olsen, 
M.D, arising out of an elective chest surgery performed by Dr. Olsen on February 6, 2003. Plaintiff 
contended that, during surgery, Dr. Olsen negligently impacted plaintiffs phrenic nerve and, in so 
doing, committed medical malpractice. A jury trial commenced on December 6, 2006, and on 
December 15, 2006, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Olsen, concluding that Dr. Olsen did 
not breach the applicable standard of care in his treatment of plaintiff. On March 26, 2007, the Court 
entered its Order Denying Motion for a New Trial and Striking Affidavit. This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff underwent rotator cuff surgery and lipoma removal surgery in December of 2002. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 751, IL 5-9; Appellant's Brief, p. 1.) On December 26, 2002, a CT pulmonary 
angiogram revealed a mediastinal cyst thought to be a pericardia! cyst. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1072, 11. 3-9.) 
On January 16, 2003, plaintiff consulted with Dr. Craig Olsen regarding treatment of the cyst. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 748, IL 7-25-p. 749, IL l-2.) During that visit with plaintiff, Dr. Olsen discussed the cyst, 
the nature of the surgery, and the potential risks and complications associated with the surgery. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 764, II. 9-20.) One such risk involved potential injury to the phrenic nerve, which could 
cause paralysis of the diaphragm. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 765, II. 16-20.) Dr. Olsen also informed plaintiff of 
alternative courses of treatment available, and the risks associated with each of the alternative 
courses of treatment. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 760-764.) Plaintiff elected to have the cyst removed in 
surgery, and his surgery was scheduled for February 6, 2003. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 766, 11. 3-12.) 
Subsequent to the surgery, plaintiff was diagnosed with a paralyzed left hemidiaphragm 
(Appellant's Brief, p. l ), thereby suggesting that his phrenic nerve may have been injured as a result 
of surgery. (See Tr. Vol. r, p. 765, 11. 16-20.) 
C. Course of Relevant Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State ofldaho on July 13, 2005. (R. Vol. I, p. 9-14.) A jury trial was set to 
commence on December 6, 2006. (R. Vol. I, p. 15.) On November 20, 2006, plaintiff filed a 
document entitled, "Plaintiffs Motions in Limine." (Supp. R. Vol. I, p.138-140.) Plaintiffs 
Motions in Limine contained several requests; among them were the following: 
Defense counsel and witnesses should be barred from mentioning the consent form 
signed by Mr. Thomson or making any suggestion that consent given to his surgery 
implies consent to "known complications." 
Defense counsel and witnesses should not be allowed to make reference in any manner to 
damage to the phrenic nerve as being a "known complication" of Dr. Olsen's surgery 
until an adequate medical foundation is provided with support for that proposition which 
otherwise, is mere argument and barred by "Daubert" as interpreted by the Idaho 
decisions. 
(Supp. R. Vol. f, p.138-139). For purposes of this brief, Respondent refers to these respective 
· requests as (I) Motion in Li mine Re: Consent, and; (2) Motion in Limine Re: Known Complications. 
I. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: Consent. 
As described above, plaintiff filed his Motion in Limine Re: Consent on November 20, 2006. 
(Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 138-140.) During a pretrial conference in the district court's chambers, the Court 
informed plaintiffs counsel that rulings on many of plaintiffs motions in limine would have to wait 
and "would depend on whether or not foundations were laid, and so forth." (Tr. 12/04/06, p. 61, IL 
7-23.) This pretrial conference took place on November 28, 2006. (R. Vol. I, p 6.) On December 4, 
2006, at a hearing concerning other matters in the case, plaintiffs counsel requested clarification 
regarding the district court's ruling on plaintiffs Motion in _Limine Re: Consent. (See Tr. 12/04/06, 
p. 66, IL 9-25.) The district court informed counsel for plaintiff and counsel for Dr. Olsen that the 
consent forms were admissible and that the Court would give a curative instruction in the event Dr. 
Olsen offered evidence or testimony to suggest that plaintiff consented to negligence by signing the 
consent forms. (Tr. 12/04/06, p. 66, IL 9-25 - p. 67, IL l-13). Again, on December 6, 2006,just 
prior to voir dire, plaintiffs counsel requested the district court to clarify its decision ruling on 
plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Consent. (Tr. Vol.!, p. 8, II. 13-25.) The Court confirmed that it 
denied plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Consent. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 9, IL 1-20.) 
2. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: Known Complications. 
Plaintiff filed his Motion in Limine Re: Known Complications on November 20, 2006. 
(Supp. R. Vol. I, p.138-140.) As with plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Consent, during the 
November 28, 2006 pretrial conference, the district court explained that plaintiffs motions in limine 
would have to be considered in the context of trial and "would depend on whether or not foundations 
were laid, and so forth." (Tr. 12/04/06, p. 61, IL 7-23.) 
During a December 4, 2006 hearing on other matters, plaintiff requested rulings from the 
district court on his Motion in Limine Re: Known Complications. (Tr. 12/04/06, p. 60, II. 16-25 -p. 
61, II. !). The district court denied plaintiffs motion, indicating that it would allow testimony 
regarding known complications of plaintiffs surgery so Jong as proper foundation was laid for such 
testimony. (Tr. 12/04/06, p. 65, IL 3-23.) Again, on December 6, 2006,just prior to voir dire, the 
district court affirmed its denial of plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Known Complications. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 8, I. 13 - p.10, I. 18.) The Court explained, "if an expert witness is asked to opine about 
complications that are common or known in this type of surgery, that assuming there's an adequate 
foundation laid for the testimony, that I would allow that testimony." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10, II. 7-11.) 
During his case-in-chief, Dr. Olsen called two retained expert witnesses, including Douglas 
Wood, M.D. (a thoracic surgeon practicing in Seattle, Washington) and Jeffrey Symmonds, M.D. (a 
vascular surgeon practicing in Boise, Idaho), along with the assistant surgeon, Kirby Orme, M.D., 
and Craig Olsen M.D. Over plaintiff's objection, Dr. Wood testified that damage to the phrenic 
nerve was a known risk of the at-issue surgery (Tr. Vol. I, p. 766, II. 13-25 - p. 767, II. 1-7), as did 
Dr. Symmonds (Tr. Vol. I, p.825, II. 19-25 - p. 826, II. 1-4), Dr. Orme (Tr. Vol. I, p. 792, II. 9-25 -
p. 793, II. 1-3), and Dr. Olsen (Tr. Vol. I, p. 766, II. 13-25 - p.767, II. 1-7.) 
3. Dr. Olsen 's Motion to Exclude Robert Shuman, MD. 
On December 1, 2006, Dr. Olsen filed Defendant Craig Olsen, M.D.'s Motion to Exclude 
Plaintiffs Expert Dr. Robert Shuman on the grounds that Dr. Shuman, plaintiffs sole expert 
witness, was not adequately familiar with the applicable standard of care. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 205-
207.) According to plaintiff's counsel, Dr. Shuman intended to testify that he had a telephone 
conversation with a Boise, Idaho surgeon, Austin Cushman, M.D ., in an effort to familiarize himself 
with the applicable standard of care; that of a thoracic surgeon practicing surgery in Boise, Idaho in 
February 2008. (Tr. 12/04/06, p. 7, I. 23- p. 10, 1.12; Tr. 12/04/06, p. 22, II. 23-25-p. 23, II. 1-5.) It 
was further explained by plaintiff's counsel that Dr. Shuman would testify that Dr. Cushman 
informed him that he was a general surgeon, that Dr. Cushman had performed "these sorts of 
procedures," and that Dr. Cushman was familiar with the applicable standard of care. (Tr. 12/4/06, 
p. 10, 11. 5-8.) The district court denied Dr. Olsen's motion; however, it noted that Dr. Olsen may, at 
a later time, move to exclude Dr. Shuman as an expert based upon his trial testimony with respect to 
his familiarity or lack of familiarity with the applicable standard of care. (Tr. 12/04/06, p. 42, 11. 18-
25 -p. 45, l. 3.) 
Dr. Shuman testified at trial on December 7, 2006. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 200.) During his direct 
examination, Dr. Shuman testified that he familiarized himself with the standard of care applicable 
to thoracic surgeons practicing in the community of Boise, Idaho in February 2003 by speaking with 
Dr. Cushman. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 235, ll. 2-16.) Dr. Shuman also testified that Dr. Cushman informed 
him that he was a vascular surgeon who had performed or assisted in the performance of thoracic 
surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 232, II. 4-8.) 
As a result of Dr. Shuman's trial testimony, Dr. Olsen filed the Affidavit of Austin R. 
Cushman, M.D. on December 8, 2007. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 230, Ex. 8.) In his affidavit, Dr. 
Cushman testified that he was not a vascular or thoracic surgeon, but rather, was a general surgeon 
whose practice focused on colon and rectal surgery. (Supp. R. Vol. I, 230, Ex. 8, 12.) Dr. Cushman 
also testified that he was not familiar with the standard of care for a thoracic surgeon practicing in 
Boise, Idaho in February 2003. (Supp. R. Vol. I, 230, Ex. 8, 1 6.) Further, in contrast to Dr. 
Shuman's trial testimony, Dr. Cushman testified that at no time during his conversation with Dr. 
Shuman did he inform Dr. Shuman that he had performed or assisted in the removal of a pericardia! 
cyst, or that he was familiar with the standard of care for a thoracic surgeon practicing surgery in 
Boise, Idaho in February 2003. (Supp. R. Vol. I, 230, Ex. 8, 116-7.) 
With the Affidavit of Dr. Cushman, M.D., Dr. Olsen moved to strike Dr. Shuman's 
testimony and moved to dismiss the action based on Dr. Shuman's failure to familiarize himself with 
the applicable standard of care. (Tr. Vol. I., p. 398, l. 21 - p. 402 l. 20.) The district court denied 
Dr. Olsen's motion to strike and motion to dismiss, explaining that it was up to the jury to determine 
whether Dr. Shuman testified truthfully. (Tr. Vol. I., p. 405, IL 8-23.) Nevertheless, the district 
court ruled that Dr. Olsen would be permitted to call Dr. Cushman as a witness to "discredit" Dr. 
Shuman's testimony. (Tr. Vol I., p. 406, 11. 4-7.) 
Dr. Cushman testified at trial on December 13, 2006. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 878, II. 11-18.) 
Plaintiff objected to his testimony on the ground that Dr. Olsen did not disclose Dr. Cushman as a 
witness by the district court's pretrial deadline. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 582, ll. 3-15.) The Court denied 
plaintiffs objection and explained that prior to trial, plaintiffs counsel had assured the Court that 
Dr. Shuman would testify that he was familiar with the applicable standard of care. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
586, ll. I 0-16.) The district court reiterated that evaluating the credibility of Dr. Shuman and Dr. 
Cushman was a task reserved for the trier of fact. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 586, 11. 10-16.) Accordingly, the 
district court explained that Dr. Cushman's in-person trial testimony was required to ensure plaintiff 
was provided with an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Cushman before the jury. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 587, 
IL 16-19.) Although the district court permitted Dr. Olsen to call Dr. Cushman as an impeachment 
witness, the court reminded counsel for Dr. Olsen that, because Dr. Cushman was being called as an 
impeachment witness and not an expert witness, that Dr. Cushman's testimony would need to be 
"quite limited." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 588, II. 9-16.) 
During his direct examination, Dr. Cushman confirmed the contents of his affidavit. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 878-882.) Following Dr. Cushman's direct examination, plaintiff was afforded the 
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Cushman. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 882.) Following Dr. Cushman's cross-
examination, plaintiff called Dr. Cushman's secretary, Bonnie Lee, to testify in an attempt to 
impeach Dr. Cushman's testimony. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 903.) By subpoenaing Ms. Lee and calling her to 
testify at trial, plaintiff sought to establish that Dr. Cushman had reviewed certain records prior to 
speaking with Dr. Shuman. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 892, II. 7-25.) Plaintiff alleged that Ms. Lee informed 
plaintiffs counsel that Dr. Cushman had, in fact, reviewed case specific materials prior to speaking 
with Dr. Shuman. (Tr. Vol. I, p 892, II. 20-23.) 
During Ms. Lee's direct examination, plaintiffs counsel handed Ms. Lee Plaintiffs Exhibit 
85. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 904, II. 21-23.) Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 was purportedly an e-mail with attached 
documents sent from plaintiffs counsel to Ms. Lee. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 904, II. 13-19.) Ms. Lee, 
however, did not have an independent recollection of Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 907, II. 9-
11), and Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 did not refresh Ms. Lee's recollection of receiving documents from 
plaintiffs counsel. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 907, II. 19-21.) In addition, Ms. Lee could not recall receiving the 
e-mail marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 85. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 907, IL 22-23.) The district court denied 
admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 85. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 908.) 
Plaintiff then offered plaintiffs Exhibit 86 into evidence. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 910, II. 17-22.) 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 86 was purportedly a reply from Ms. Lee to Exhibit 8.5 (the e-mail from plaintiffs 
counsel.) (Tr. Vol. I, p. 908, II. 4-17.) Because plaintiffs Exhibit 86 contained the e-mail that 
plaintiff unsuccessfully offered into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 85, the district court admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 86 with the e-mail (Plaintiffs Exhibit 85) removed from the exhibit. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
910, ll. 17-25 -p. 911, ll. 1-13.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Olsen's counsel to question 
prospective jurors regarding sympathy during voir dire; 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing Austin Cushman, M.D to testify 
at trial; 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding an e-mail purportedly sent by 
plaintiffs counsel to Austin Cushman, M.D; 
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing testimony and evidence regarding 
plaintiffs informed consent to surgery; and 
5. Whether· the district court abused its discretion in allowing expert testimony as to whether 
damage to a patient's phrenic nerve is a known complication of the type of surgery 
undergone by plaintiff. 
III. REQUEST FOR REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Respondent requests his costs and reasonable attorneys' fees on appeal. I.AR. 40, 41; Idaho 
Code§ 12-121. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Dr. Olsen's Counsel to 
Question Prospective Jurors Regarding Sympathy During Voir Dire. 
Plaintiffs first argument on appeal is the assertion that the district court erred in permitting 
Dr. Olsen's counsel to ask, "How do you rate yourself on the sympathy thing, on a basis of one to 
ten, where would you fall?" (Appellant's Brief, p. 2.) First, Dr. Olsen's counsel never asked this 
particular question, during voir dire. 1 Second, plaintiff has failed to identify the ruling or rulings of 
the district court upon which this issue on appeal is based and, therefore, because such failure 
constitutes a violation ofI.A.R. 35, the Court should not consider this issue on appeal. Third, even 
if the Court reviews this issue on appeal, plaintiff has not, and cannot, meet his burden of proving 
that the district court abused its discretion at anytime during voir dire. Fourth, plaintiffs argument 
on this issue is devoid of any valid supporting authority. For these reasons, and for the reasons set 
forth below, the district court did not abuse its discretion during voir dire, and no ruling of the 
district court during voir dire should be reversed on appeal. 
I. The standard of review applicable to the district court's rulings during voir dire. 
The district court's selection of jurors is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 
Morris ex rel. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 14 l, 937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997); State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598,600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); State v. Merrifield, 109 Idaho 11, 17, 704 P.2d343 
348 (Ct. App. l 985). "It is in the trial court's discretion to determine whether a juror can render a 
fair and impaiiial verdict." Morris at 141,937 P.2d at 1215. 
1 At one point during voir dire examination, counsel for Dr. Olsen asked those jurors who would 
be guided by sympathy to identify themselves: Mr. Hall: " .. .In deciding a case like this, it is 
necessary that you decide the case basically with your head and not your heart. You will be 
instructed that you should put aside sympathy in deciding a case like this. And I am going to ask 
each one of you at the end of my individual discussions if you would be able to put aside sympathy 
and study the case on the basis of the merits with your head rather than with your heart. Is there 
anybody before we go into that who feels they cannot do that? I've had some people say, you know, 
I don't have sympathy for anybody. I've had some people say I have too much sympathy; I would 
be totally guided by the sympathy factor. But if you're on the scale of one to five with the highest 
sympathy level being five, how many people think they're a five on that scale?" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 106, 
II. 24-25 - p. 107, II. 1-17.) Plaintiffs counsel did not object to this question, and as discussed in 
Section IV A(3) on page 15, thereby waived his right to address this question on appeal. 
"When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-
tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is ( 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." Leavitt v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624,631, 991 P.2d 349, 
356 (1999). 
2. Plaintiff failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) and, therefore, the 
Court should not review this issue on appeal. 
I.AR 35(a)(6) requires appellant briefs to contain an argument section: 
Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons 
therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
transcript and record relied upon. 
A party's failure to comply with I.A.R. 35(a) on an appellate issue will result in the Court's 
refusal to review that issue on appeal. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153,159,653 P.2d 17, 23 
(1983); Jensen v. Doherty, IO I Idaho 910, 91 l, 623 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1983). "The [Supreme Court 
of Idaho] has consistently followed the rule that it will not review the actions of a district court 
which have not qeen specifically assigned as error[,] especially where there are no authorities cited 
nor argument contained in the briefs upon the question." Bolen v. Baker, 69 Idaho 93, 99,203 P.2d 
376, 379 (I 949). 
In Jensen, the Court refused to review plaintiff's appeal and awarded attorney fees on appeal 
to the respondent based on the appellant's failure to comply with I.A.R. 35. Jensen at 91 I, 623 P.2d 
at 1288. In that case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's order of involuntary dismissal; however, 
plaintiff, among other failures, failed to "provide a sufficient record or any argument concerning the 
propriety of the involuntary dismissal of his action." Id at 911, 623 P.2d at 1288. As the Court 
explained in Jensen, absent compliance with the appellate rules, the court will not review the record 
for error. Id 
In this case, as in Jensen, plaintiff has failed to comply with I.A.R. 35. With respect to the 
first issue on appeal, the argument section within plaintiffs brief contains no citation to Idaho 
authority and most troubling, no citations to the district court's transcript from voir dire. Therefore, 
plaintiff has clearly failed to comply with LA.R. 35(a)(6), and as such, the Court should not review 
this issue on appeal. 
Without providing any guidance as to the particular ruling or rulings of the district court upon 
which plaintiffs appeal on this issue is based, this Court is unable to evaluate whether the district 
court abused its discretion in light of the three step inquiry applied in Swain ("Swain analysis"). 
First, this Court will be unable to determine whether the district court "rightly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion." Swain at 631, 99 J P.2d at 356. In his failure to cite to a particular error of the 
district court, plaintiff has simply placed no "issue" before the court. Second, the Court will be 
unable to determine whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries ofits discretion and 
consistent with applicable legal standards. Id. Finally, without citing to a particular ruling of the 
district court, there is no way of determining whether the district court reached a decision on the 
issue by an exercise ofreason as plaintiff has failed to place any decision of the district court before 
this Court for review. Id 
Here, since plaintiff has failed to identify a particular error of the district court in the record, 
plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing that the district court abused its discretion in voir 
dire. For these reasons, the Court should not consider this issue on appeal. See generally, Jensen at 
911, 623 P .2d at 1288 ( stating that "( e ]rror is never presumed on appeal, the burden of showing it is 
upon the party alleging it"). 
3. Even if the Court reviews this issue on appeal, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that 
the district court abused its discretion, and has failed to demonstrate that he suffered 
prejudice as a result. 
Even if this Court were to consider plaintiffs blanket objection to voir dire as a proper issue 
on appeal, a review of the district court's transcript during voir dire reveals that plaintiffs counsel 
placed only one·objection to questions by Dr. Olsen's counsel on the issue of juror sympathy: 
MR. HALL: And how would you rate yourself on the sympathy? 
MR. SCHLENDER: Objection 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR SUNDERLAND: After coming back from 
Iraq, I've seen a lot of stuff that would pull at your heart strings, but 
at the same time I've seen some stuff that can turn you cold. I would 
say I'm right about three. 
MR. HALL: If you were instructed to put aside sympathy, you would be able to do that? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR SUNDERLAND: Absolutely. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 112, II. 13-24.) Therefore, even if this Court entertains the issue of juror sympathy on 
appeal, the district court's ruling on this particular objection is the only conceivable basis for 
plaintiffs appeal, since it was the only objection lodged by plaintiff on the issue of juror sympathy.2 
See Lan¾ford v. Nicholson Mfg. Co, 126 Idaho 187, 879 P.2d 1120 (1994) (holding that appellate 
review is limited to those issues raised during trial). 
If the question to Mr. Sunderland is indeed the basis for plaintiff's appeal, and if the Court 
chooses to review this issue on appeal, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling 
plaintiff's objection because the district court satisfied all three elements of the Court's analysis in 
Swain. First, the district court accurately recognized that its ruling on plaintiff's objection was a 
ruling within its discretion. Idaho R. Civ. P. 47(i) provides that the trial court is charged with 
supervising voir dire "to insure a speedy, fair, and thorough examination of the jurors." In 
supervising voir dire, it is "clear that the primary responsibility for voir dire and the selection of 
competent jurors rests upon the trial judge," Quincy v. Joint School Dist. No. 41, 102 Idaho 764, 768, 
640 P.2d 304,308 (198 I), and it is the trial court and not [the reviewing court] which is in a position 
to determine first hand whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict." id. ( citations and 
internal quotations omitted). Therefore, the district court satisfied the first element of the Swain 
analysis. 
In satisfaction of the second element of the Swain analysis, the district court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards in ruling upon 
plaintiff's objection. The question asked of Mr. Sunderland to which plaintiff objected was designed 
to ensure that Mr. Sunderland did not harbor bias in the form of sympathy. In Idaho, "[i]t is entirely 
2 Although plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine requesting the parties to instruct their witnesses not 
to provide prejudicial information (See Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 138), plaintiff did not file a motion in 
proper for counsel to ask the jurors such questions as may reasonably be necessary to ascertain 
whether they are. free from bias or interest that may affect their verdict." Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 
901, 906, 120 P.3d 289,294 (Ct. App. 2005). Such questions effectuate the purpose ofvoir dire, 
which is designed to enable litigants to select a jury "composed of men and women qualified and 
competent to judge and determine the facts in issue without bias, prejudice, or partiality." 47 
Am.Jur. 2d. Jury § 167, (2006). Since the question asked of Mr. Sunderland was designed to 
eliminate bias, the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and in accordance 
with applicable legal standards in overruling plaintiff's objection. 
In satisfaction of the third and final element of the Swain analysis, the district court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. As described above, the purpose of voir dire is to ensure that· 
an impartial jury is selected. In questioning Mr. Sunderland, counsel for Dr. Olsen was inquiring 
whether Mr. Sunderland would be able to evaluate the case based on the evidence rather than 
emotion. Since such a question is specifically designed to ferret out bias to accomplish the purpose 
of voir dire, and since the district court is charged with supervising voir dire, the district court acted 
within reason in overruling the objection by plaintiff's counsel. Because the court satisfied all three 
elements of the Swain analysis overruling plaintiff's objection, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
Further, ·to the extent the Court reviews this issue on appeal, plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of the questions asked of Mr. Sunderland. "The 
rule of harmless error establishes that any error, defect, irregularity or variance cited on appeal which 
limine to preclude Dr. Olsen's counsel from asking jurors to rate their level of sympathy. 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." State v. Harper, 129 Idaho 86, 91,922 P.2d 
383 (1996). Here, plaintiff suffered no prejudice since Mr. Sunderland did not ultimately serve on 
the jury. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 149, ll. 18-25 -p. 150, 11. 1-6; See R., Vol. I, p 23-24.) Therefore, it cannot 
be said that Mr. Sunderland's perceived level of sympathy unfairly favored Dr. Olsen or impaired 
plaintiff's right to an impartial jury. 
Finally, plaintiff accepted the jury without objection. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 150, ll. 7-9.) Therefore, 
to the extent plaintiff alleges that he suffered prejudice as a result of the jury as-selected, plaintiff's 
failure to object constituted a waiver of this issue on appeal. Morris at 141, 937 P.2d at 1215 
(plaintiff's failure to challenge jurors during voir dire constituted waiver of objection and waiver of 
issue on appeal). 
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling plaintiff's 
objection to the question asked of Mr. Sunderland. 
4. Plaintiff has failed to support his argument with valid authority. 
In support of his argument, plaintiff cites dicta from a distant trial court that was actually 
reversed on appeal on the very basis for which plaintiff relies on the case. (Appellant's Brief, p. 3.) 
The language plaintiff mistakenly relies on in the Lamb case is from the trial court, not the appellate 
court, and is as follows: 
Now it obviously would be very helpful to counsel to know which are 
the most sympathetic jurors and ask them to rate themselves on a 
scale of one to ten. Then the defendant would put those - all those 
who rate themselves below five for the defendant. The plaintiff 
would pick all those who rate themselves higher than ten for 
sympathy, but that's not what the purpose ofvoir dire is; and that's 
why the Court will sustain the objection to those two questions. 
Lamb v. Burns, 202 Conn. 158, 520 A.2d 190 (1987) at fn 1. 
The trial court's opinion quoted above was rejected by the Supreme Court of Connecticut and 
plaintiffs reliance on this case is misplaced. In Lamb, plaintiff filed a lawsuit based upon serious 
personal injuries that she and her three children suffered in an automobile accident. Id. at 159. 
During voir dire, counsel for the defendant asked, "[I]f you met a person when you were walking 
down the street and that person exhibited some signs of injury or was disabled, would you feel 
feelings of sympathy for that person?" Id. at 161. Plaintiffs objection to this question was sustained 
on the grounds that it was "irrelevant on the issue of prejudice." Id. Defendant appealed, arguing 
that the trial court "erroneously thwarted the defendant's legitimate objective of determining which 
prospective jurors were most apt to be hindered in making factual assessments at trial by feelings of 
sympathy." Id. 
Contrary to plaintiffs representation of the ruling in the Lamb case, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut, in fact, agreed with defendant and ordered a new trial. Id. at 166. The Court explained, 
"[W]hen a considerable potential exists for feelings of sympathy to have a bearing upon the outcome 
of a case, a query seeking to uncover the extent of a juror's susceptibility to such feelings should be 
permitted. It was of vital importance to the defendant that any such susceptibility be brought to 
light." Id. at 163. The Court further explained that the defendant had a right to inquire of jurors 
regarding their sympathy "to forage for possible prejudices and unusual levels of sympathy." Id. at 
165. Because the ruling of the trial court made it impossible for the defendant to make such an 
inquiry, the Court ordered a new trial. Id. at 165-66. 
In the instant case, the district court properly allowed counsel for Dr. Olsen to question 
prospective jurors to ensure that the jury would not be influenced by prejudice and unusual levels of 
sympathy. The questions that Dr. Olsen's counsel asked prospective jurors, including Mr. 
Sunderland, were directly related to uncovering the extent of their susceptibility to sympathy and 
bias and were in no way prejudicial to plaintiff at any time during voir dire. 
Based on the above, the district court's decision to allow Dr. Olsen's counsel to question the 
jurors as he did regarding sympathy should be affirmed. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion In Allowing The Testimony of Austin 
Cushman, M.D., Because Dr. Cushman was Called As An Impeachment Witness. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred when it allowed Dr. Cushman to testify at trial 
because he was not disclosed as an expert witness in accordance with the district court's scheduling 
order. (Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) Dr. Olsen, however, called Dr. Cushman not for the purpose of 
obtaining Dr. Cushman's expert testimony to support his case-in-chief, but rather, as a fact witness 
called to impeach the trial testimony of plaintiffs expert, Dr. Robert Shuman, regarding the contents 
of a phone conversation Dr. Shuman had with Dr. Cushman. Further, plaintiff had the opportunity to 
cross-examine Dr. Cushman and has failed to demonstrate that he suffered improper prejudice as a 
result of the district court's decision to allow Dr. Cushman to testify. Therefore, the district court's 
decision to allow Dr. Cushman to testify at trial should be affirmed. 
1. The standard of review applicable to the district court's decision to allow witness 
testimony. 
Decisions of the trial court regarding the admission of evidence will not be overturned absent 
a "clear and manifest abuse of discretion." Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc. 
132 Idaho 295, 304, 971 P.2d 1119, 1128 (1999). "Trial judges have broad discretion in determining 
admissibility of impeachment evidence, and their decision will not be overturned absent a clear 
showing of abuse." Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, I 10, 753 P.2d 1253, 1256 (1987) 
(citingQuickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,780, 727P.2d 1187(1986)). 
2. Dr. Cushman was called to impeach the testimony of Dr. Shuman. 
Plaintiff argues the district court should have characterized Dr. Cushman's testimony as 
"rebuttal testimony" and, therefore, not permitted Dr. Cushman's testimony at trial due to Dr. 
Olsen's alleged failure to disclose him as a witness before trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12.) 
Plaintiffs use of the phrase "rebuttal testimony" instead of "impeachment testimony" is simply a 
distinction without a difference in this case given that Dr. Cushman was called to testify at trial to 
directly contradict the trial testimony of Dr. Shuman. See generally, Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 
Idaho 681, 39 P.3d 621 (2001) (providing that impeachment evidence "is that which is directed to 
the credibility of a witness.") The following w1disputable facts establish that Dr. Cushman was 
called at trial to directly impeach/rebut the trial testimony of Dr. Shuman: (I) Dr. Shwnan 
significantly added to his testimony at trial with respect to the content of the telephone conversation 
between Dr. Cushman and Dr. Shuman; (2) Dr. Cushman provided only factual testimony, not expert 
testimony, regarding the telephone conversation he had with Dr. Shuman; and (3) Dr. Cushman was 
called only to contradict the trial testimony of Dr. Shuman with respect to the at-issue telephone 
conversation. These three undisputable facts are evidenced through a detailed examination of Dr. 
Shuman's deposition and trial testimony, along with Dr. Cushman's affidavit and trial testimony. 
Dr. Shuman' s trial testimony greatly expanded from his deposition testimony with respect to 
what he recalled discussing on the phone with Dr. Cushman. In his deposition, Dr. Shuman testified, 
in an effort to establish that he was adequately familiar with the standard of care, that Dr. Cushman 
had informed him that in Boise, Idaho in 2003, board certified cardiovascular surgeons were 
basically performing the surgeries in question: 
Q Okay. And when did you talk to Dr. Cushman? 
A Both of these would be in November of'05. 
(Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 230, Ex. 7, Ex. A, p. 30, IL 8-19.) 
* * * * 
Q What's your understanding as to the medical training and 
area of practice of Dr. Cushman? 
A I believe he's a general and vascular surgeon. 
* * * * 
(Id., p. 31, IL 12-14.) 
Q And do you recall what you discussed with Dr. Cushman? 
A We basically discussed who was doing thoracic surgery in 
Boise. You know, was it general vascular surgeons doing 
thoracic? Was it cardiovascular surgeons? 
And he had said that there was a time where general 
surgeons would do thoracic surgical cases, but at the time 
in question, it was now all basically board certified 
cardiovascular surgeons, that there were enough in town. 
(Id, p. 30, lL 20-25 - p. 31, ll. 1- 5.) This was the only information Dr. Shuman testified to in his 
deposition regarding his conversation with Dr. Cushman. 
At trial, Dr. Shuman greatly expanded his purported recollection of this conversation by 
testifying that Dr. Cushman had told him that he was familiar with pericardia! cyst removal surgery 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 222, ll. 12-25); that Dr. Cushman had assisted in thoracoscopic procedures (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 231, ll. 12-17); that Dr. Cushman was a vascular surgeon (Tr. Vol. I, p. 222, ll. 11-16); and that 
Dr. Cushman was familiar with the applicable standard of care (Tr. Vol. I, p. 235, ll. 2-7). Because 
Dr. Olsen was not aware of these additional details Dr. Shuman allegedly discussed with Dr. 
Cushman until Dr. Shuman testified at trial, despite the fact Dr. Olsen's counsel questioned Dr. 
Shuman on this very topic during his deposition - Dr. Olsen informed the district court that he may 
subpoena Dr. Cushman to testify at trial regarding whether Dr. Cushman was in fact a vascular 
surgeon who was familiar with the standard of care for the applicable surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 240, IL 
3-5.) 
On December 8, 2007, Dr. Olsen filed the Affidavit of Austin Cushman, M.D. (Supp. R. Vol. 
I, p. 230, Ex. 8.) In direct opposition to Dr. Shuman's trial testimony, Dr. Cushman testified that he 
(!) was not a vascular surgeon; (2) was not a thoracic surgeon; (3) had never performed or assisted 
in a thoracoscopk procedure or the removal of a pericardia! cyst; and, ( 4) did not inform Dr. Shuman 
that he was familiar with the standard of care for a thoracic surgeon practicing surgery in Boise, 
Idaho in February 2003, because he was not a thoracic or vascular surgeon and had never performed 
or assisted with such surgery. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 230, Ex. 8, 11 3-7.) Confronted with the 
conflicting testimony of Dr. Cushman and Dr. Shuman regarding what Dr. Cushman told Dr. 
Shuman regarding Dr. Cushman's knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the standard of care 
applicable to the at-issue surgery, the district court recognized that evaluating the affidavit testimony 
of Dr. Cushman with the trial testimony of Dr. Shuman was a task reserved for the trier of fact: 
THE COURT: Now, I don't know if it's possible to reconcile the 
affidavit testimony of Dr. Cushman with the in-court testimony of Dr. 
Shuman or not. However, it does occur to me that it is not- that the 
court is not in a position to be making a judgment call with respect to 
whether or not Dr. Shuman was testifying truthfully or whether Dr. 
Cushman's affidavit is or is not truthful. It could be that one or the 
other of them is not telling the truth. The fact of the matter is, the 
information is here and before us and in the record, and Dr. Shuman 
testified the way he testified. The defendants will be able to call Dr. 
Cushman as a witness and let the jury determine whether - to 
discredit the testimony of Dr. Shuman if they choose to do that. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 405, ll. 16-25-p. 406, ll. 1-7.) 
Therefore, in allowing Dr. Cushman to testify at trial, the district court acted within the 
boundaries of its.discretion in providing the jury with the opportunity to evaluate Dr. Cushman's and 
Dr. Shuman's conflicting testimony and respective credibility. See Stanley v. Lennox Industries, 
Inc., 140 Idaho 785, 789, l 02 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2004) (holding _that "[i]t is not proper for the trial 
judge to asses the credibility of an affiant at the summary judgment stage when credibility can be 
tested in the court before the trier of fact"). 
As discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Dr. Cushman 
to testify at trial regarding what he told Dr. Shuman regarding his knowledge ( or lack thereof) of the 
at-issue surgery. Dr. Cushman's testimony was only necessary and relevant once Dr. Shuman 
significantly altered his testimony at trial regarding what Dr. Cushman said to Dr. Shuman. If the 
district court had not permitted Dr. Cushman to testify at trial, it would have prevented the jury from 
assessing Dr. Shuman's testimony, thereby precluding Dr. Olsen from challenging Dr. Shuman's 
credibility as a witness. For these reasons, the district court did not commit a manifest abuse of its 
discretion in permitting Dr. Cushman to testify at trial and, therefore, the district court's decision to 
allow Dr. Cushman to testify at trial should be affirmed. 
3. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate improper prejudice as a result of the district 
court's decision to allow Dr. Cushman 's testimony. 
Plaintiff also failed to prove that Dr. Cushman's testimony has affected one of plaintiffs 
substantial rights rather, all plaintiff can show is that Dr. Cushman disagreed with what Dr. 
Shuman represented to the jury with respect to the telephone conversation Dr. Shuman and Dr. 
Cushman had with one another. Without such a showing, the district court's decision to allow this 
testimony must be affirmed. Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd, 127 Idaho 565,903 P.2d 730 
(1995). 
Plaintiff claims, "[t]he testimony of Dr. Cushman was devastating to plaintiffs case" 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 4.); however, plaintiff is not accurate in asserting that "[Dr. Cushman] refuted 
key elements of Dr. Shuman's expert witness testimony." (Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) (emphasis 
added.) As discussed above, Dr. Cushman did not provide expert testimony, but instead provided 
factual information that contradicted the required foundation for Dr. Shuman's standard of care 
expert opinions and called into question Dr. Shuman's credibility. Had Dr. Shuman testified 
consistent with his deposition testimony, and had Dr. Shuman provided accurate testimony at trial 
regarding his conversation with Dr. Cushman, there would not have been a reason for Dr. Olsen to 
call Dr. Cushman as an impeachment witness. Further, plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to 
cross-examine Dr. Cushman and did so. Therefore, the district court's decision to allow Dr. 
Cushman's testimony did not deprive plaintiff of a substantial right. 
Astonishingly, plaintiff contends had he known Dr. Cushman would be called as a witness, 
he "could easily have had Dr. Shuman consult with another surgeon in Boise, Idaho and make 
certain this type of recantation would not irretrievably damage Mr. Thomson's case." (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 10-11. )This argument is surmising, given that Dr. Shuman misrepresented what type of a 
surgeon Dr. Cushman is and the content of the conversation he had with Dr. Cushman. Specifically, 
he misrepresented the following: 
• That Dr. Cushman informed him that he was a vascular surgeon (Tr. Vol. I. p. 222, II. 
I 1-16.); 
• That Dr. Cushman informed him that he had assisted in thoracoscopic procedures 
Cfr. Vol. I, p. 231, IL 12-17); and 
• That Dr. Cushman informed him that he was familiar with the standard of care 
applicable to a thoracic surgeon practicing surgery in Boise, Idaho in February 2003 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 235, ll. 2-7). 
For plaintiff to argue that he would not have called Dr. Shuman ifhe had kno\1/11 Dr. Cushman would 
be called to accurately report his field of specialty and the content of his conversation with Dr. 
Shuman, is nothing more than an admission by plaintiff that he did not want the truth of what was 
discussed in that telephone conversation to be revealed. it is plaintiffs expert who greatly expanded 
his testimony and, as a result, Dr. Cushman was only testifying regarding his credentials, his 
familiarity (or l~ck) with the at-issue procedure, and the content of the phone conversation. By 
permitting Dr. C::ushman to testify, the district court properly aHowed the jury to evaluate Dr. 
Shuman's credibility. See Stanley at 789, 102 P.3d at 1109. 
Second, based on the alleged content of Dr. Shuman's telephone conversation with Dr. 
Cushman, the district court held that Dr. Shuman was sufficiently familiar with the standard of care 
and that he would be allowed to testify (Tr. Vol. I, p. 235, II. 17-25 - p. 236, II. l-16.); however, 
after Dr. Cushman testified, it was clear the foundation for Dr. Shuman's opinions regarding the 
applicable standard of care did not exist. Again, the district court properly permitted the jury to 
evaluate Dr. Shuman's credibility. 
Finally, plaintiff relies upon Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 
995 P.2d 816 (2000), arguing that Dr. Olsen should have notified plaintiff of his intent to call Dr. 
Cushman as a witness. (Appellant's Brief, p. 12.) The facts of this case are much different than 
those in Perry, a:nd Perry does not support plaintiffs argument on this issue. In Perry, the district 
court's decision not to admit a videotape into evidence was affirmed on appeal when the party 
seeking to admit the videotape could have and should have produced the videotape during discovery. 
Id. at 53, 995 P.2d at 823. In Perry, which was an action for personal injuries, plaintiff filed a 
motion to compel the defendant to supplement its discovery responses. Id. at 52, 995 P.2d at 822. In 
his supporting memorandum, plaintiff alleged that the defendant "continue[ d] to attempt to hide 
witnesses under the guise of 'rebuttal' or 'impeachment' witnesses." Id. The district court ruled that 
defendant "could not call surprise witnesses until good cause was shown as to why the witness was 
not divulged to [plaintiff]." Id. 
In Perry, during her direct examination, plaintiff testified that she loved to snowmobile and 
jet-ski, yet she was unable to recall whether she had jet-skied at a location known as "Mantua." Id. 
at 52-53, 995 P.2d at 822-23. On cross-examination, defendant offered as impeachment evidence a 
videotape of the allegedly-injured plaintiff jet-skiing at Mantua. Id. at 53, 995 P.2d at 823. 
Defendant argued that the videotape was "pure impeachment evidence" because it showed that 
plaintiff testified incorrectly as to whether she had jet-skied at Mantua. Id. The district court was 
not persuaded, holding that defendant's attempt to characterize the videotape as impeachment 
evidence was "somewhat disingenuous." Id. The district court explained that the videotape, which 
was taken months before trial and was not produced in discovery despite plaintiffs motion to 
compel, was not impeachment evidence, but was evidence that the plaintiff was not injured, which 
could have been used in defendant's case-in-chief. Id. Therefore, the district court refused to admit 
the videotape into evidence, and its decision to do so was affirmed on appeal. Id 
In this case, in contrast to Perry, Dr. Cushman's testimony could not have been used in Dr. 
Olsen's case-in-thief, simply because Dr. Cushman's familiarity with the applicable standard ofcare 
( or lack thereof) was not called into question until Dr. Shuman altered his testimony at trial by 
testifying that Dr. Cushman told him that he (I) assisted in the performance of thoracic surgery; (2) 
was a vascular surgeon; and (3) was familiar with the standard of care as it applied to thoracic 
surgeon practicing in Boise, Idaho in February 2003. Unlike the facts in Perry, where the defendant 
knowingly failed to produce evidence under the guise of impeachment evidence, in this case, Dr. 
Olsen had no occasion to call Dr. Cushman as a witness until trial when Dr. Shuman misrepresented 
the contents of his telephone conversation with Dr. Cushman. Therefore, the facts in Perry are 
clearly differenffrom the facts in this matter, and Perry does not support plaintiffs argument on this 
point. 
Further, plaintiff ignores the fact that it was his burden to demonstrate that his expert witness 
was familiar with the standard of care for thoracic surgeons practicing in Boise, Idaho in 2003. 
Idaho Code§§ 6-1012, 6-1013. Apparently aware of plaintiff's burden, Dr. Shuman contacted Dr. 
Cushman prior to trial for the purpose of familiarizing himself with the applicable standard of care 
for the surgery at issue. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 220, ll. 24-25- p. 221, IL 1-13; p. 222, IL 9-25 -p. 224, ll. 
1-5.) This telephone conversation occurred in November 2005 - over one year prior to trial. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 883, 11. 23-25.) As opposed to the facts in Perry, where the plaintiff was unaware of the 
existence of the videotape until trial, in this case, plaintiff knew of, and had access to, Dr. Cushman 
long before trial. As such, plaintiff reasonably should have ensured that Dr. Cushman was familiar 
with the applicable standard of care prior to relying on his conversation with Dr. Shuman as the 
foundation for Dr. Shuman's testimony with respect to the standard of care. Therefore, even if Dr. 
Shuman' s conversation with Dr. Cushman was insufficient to familiarize himself with the applicable 
standard of care, this shortcoming was no fault of Dr. Olsen's and no fault of the district court. 
For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of 
Dr. Cushman's testimony; therefore, the district court's decision to allow Dr. Cushman to testify 
should be affirmed. 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Excluding an E-mail Between 
Plaintiff's Counsel and The Office of Austin Cushman, M.D. 
A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence, including expert witness testimony, 
is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Morris ex rel. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 
138,141,937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997). Here, the district court denied admission of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 85 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 908), and portions of Exhibit 86 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 91 I, II. 3-13). Plaintiff, 
however, has failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of these exhibits not being 
admitted in their entirety. Rather, because the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 and portions of Plaintiffs Exhibit 86, the district court's decision 
to refuse their admission should be affirmed. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 85 was purportedly an e-mail with attachments sent from plaintiff's 
counsel to Dr. Cushman's secretary, Bonnie Lee. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 892, II. 7-25.) Plaintiffs Exhibit 
86 was purportedly Ms. Lee's reply e-mail to the e-mail marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 85. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 908, II. 4-17.) Plaintiff's Exhibit 86, however, contained the very same e-mail constituting 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 85. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 910, II. 17-25-p. 91 I, II. 1-13). Plaintiff subpoenaed Ms. Lee 
to testify at trial in an attempt to demonstrate that Dr. Cushman, prior to speaking with Dr. Shuman, 
reviewed medical records purportedly attached to the e-mail marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 85. (Id.) 
Plaintiff argues that had the district court admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, the jury "could have then 
believed that Dr. Cushman was not truthful when he said he did not discuss the standard of care for 
pericardia! cyst surgery with Dr. Shuman." (Appellants Brief, p. 21.) This argument is flawed for 
several reasons. 
First, during Ms. Lee's direct examination, plaintiff's counsel handed Ms. Lee Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 85 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 904, II. 21-23); however, Ms. Lee had no independent recollection of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 85 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 907, II. 9-11 ). Further, Plaintiff's Exhibit 85 did not refresh Ms. 
Lee's recollection ofreceiving documents from plaintiff's counsel. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 907, II. 19-21.) In 
addition, Ms. Lee could not recall receiving the e-mail marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 85. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 907, 11. 22-23.) Because Ms. Lee was unable to provide the foundation necessary to admit 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 85, and because Ms. Lee did not prepare the e-mail, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying its admission or the admission of that portion of Plaintiffs Exhibit 
86. 
Plaintiff contends that the district court's refusal to admit Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 prejudiced the 
plaintiff in being able to cross-examine and impeach Dr. Cushman. Further, plaintiff claims that 
"the jury never did know that Dr. Cushman had, indeed, been given the Thomson medical records, 
operative report and Dr. Shuman' s CV .... " (Appellant's Brief, p. 20.) Plaintiff ignores, however, the 
simple fact that Dr. Cushman provided live testimony at trial that included testimony as basic as the 
type of surgeon Dr. Cushman is - a general surgeon and not as Dr. Shuman testified, a vascular 
surgeon. Plaintiff also ignores the fact that he was able to cross-examine Dr. Cushman as to whether 
he received these materials purportedly attached to Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 notwithstanding the district 
court's refusal to admit the exhibit into evidence. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 894, l. 23 - p. 900, l. I.) Further, 
regardless of whether Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 was admitted, Dr. Cushman testified that whether or not 
he reviewed anything from plaintiffs counsel would not have changed the fact that he is not a 
vascular surgeon (Tr. Vol. I, p. 915 IL 21-25 - 916, IL 1-5) and would not have changed his ability to 
tell Dr. Shuman that he somehow had knowledge of the applicable standard of care. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
915, II. 21-25-p. 916, II. l-9.) 
Based on the above, the district court's refusal to admit plaintiffs counsel's purported e-mail 
to Dr. Cushman's office was within the court's discretion, did not constitute a manifest abuse of 
discretion, and did not deprive plaintiff of his substantial rights. Therefore, the district court's 
refusal to admit Plaintiffs Exhibit 85 and portions of Plaintiffs Exhibit 86 should be affirmed. 
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion In Allowing Testimony Regarding 
Plaintiffs Informed Consent to Surgery. 
District courts are provided with broad discretion in ruling on motions in limine, and a 
district court's ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, 
Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007), as is a district court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence. Morris ex rel. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,937 P.2d 1212 (1997). 
Plaintiff argues that the district court should not have admitted consent forms signed by 
plaintiff into evidence and testimony regarding plaintiff's informed consent to surgery, because his 
complaint did not include a count for lack of informed consent (Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) It is 
plaintiffs position that admitting evidence of informed consent in negligence cases leads jurors to 
believe that the person consenting to surgery has consented to negligence. Plaintiff, however, has 
failed to demonstrate that the district court's decision to allow testimony and admit evidence 
regarding plaintiff's informed consent to surgery did, in fact, confuse the jury. 
Prior to trial, the district court affirmed its denial of plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: 
Consent, but indicated that it would give a curative instruction in the event Dr. Olsen offered 
evidence or testimony to suggest that plaintiff consented to negligence by signing the consent forms. 
(Tr. 12/04/06, p. 66, IL 9-25-p. 67, ll. 1-13; Tr. Vol. I,p. 8, ll. 13-25-p. 9, ll. 1-20.) In Appellant's 
Brief, plaintiff has failed to cite to any portion of the record to suggest that Dr. Olsen or his counsel 
offered evidence and testimony regarding informed consent to imply that plaintiff consented to 
negligence. Further, plaintiff has failed to cite any portion of the record to demonstrate that he 
objected to such evidence and testimony on these grounds during trial. 
In support of his argument on this issue, plaintiff refers the Court to Foster v. Traul, 141 
Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005), and Sherwood v. Carter, I 19 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991). 
Although these cases provide that informed consent and negligence are separate causes of action, 
these cases do not stand for the proposition that evidence of informed consent is per se inadmissible 
in an action for negligence, as that issue was not before the Court in either of those instances. 
Therefore, these cases do not support plaintiffs argument. 
Here, Dr'. Olsen agrees that plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial did not include a 
count for informed consent regarding the resection of plaintiffs pericardial cyst. (See R. Vol. I, p. 9-
14.) Nevertheless, plaintiff "opened the door" for Dr. Olsen to offer evidence and testimony 
regarding informed consent because he testified that Dr. Olsen never discussed the risks associated 
with the surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 603, IL 23-25-p. 604, 11.1-9). To impeach this testimony, Dr. Olsen 
moved for the admission of the consent forms signed by plaintiff, which provide, "the need, the 
nature of the procedure, the alternatives available, and the reasonable risks related to this procedure 
were explained to me to my full satisfaction, by the above-named designee." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 627, II. 
15-19.) In contrast to plaintiffs testimony, Dr. Olsen testified that he did, in fact, inform plaintiff of 
the risks of surgery, including potential injury to the phrenic nerve, which could ultimately lead to a 
paralyzed hemi 0diaphragm. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 765, 11. 16-20.) Because this testimony was used to 
challenge that of plaintiffs testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Van Bruntv. 
Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 39 P.3d 621 (2001); Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 753 P.2d 
1253 (1987). 
Not only was admission of the consent form necessary to impeach plaintiffs testimony that 
he was not apprised of the risks of surgery, admission of the consent forms was also necessary to 
counter Dr. Shuman's testimony that injury to the phrenic nerve was not a known complication of 
plaintiffs surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 328, IL 9-10.) If damage to the phrenic nerve was not a known risk 
of plaintiffs surgery (which it was), Dr. Olsen would have had no reason to inform plaintiff that 
injury to the phrenic nerve was a potential risk of plaintiffs surgery. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 765, II. 16-
20.) 
Finally, the interaction between Dr. Olsen and plaintiff prior to, during, and after his surgery 
was highly relevant to the issue whether Dr. Olsen met the applicable standard of care in his care and 
treatment of plaintiff. Dr. Olsen owed plaintiff an affirmative statutory duty to obtain plaintiffs 
informed consent to perform the surgery under Idaho Code§ 39-4508. This is because, "the doctrine 
of informed consent is the general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose to his 
patient those risks of injury which might result from a proposed course of treatment." Sherwoodv. 
Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 251, 805 P.2d 452,457 (l 99l)(citations omitted). Therefore, Dr. Olsen's 
testimony regarding plaintiffs consent to surgery provided a complete context as to why plaintiff 
was seeking treatment from Dr. Olsen, what plaintiff knew before the surgery in making his decision 
to have it, the items considered by Dr. Olsen regarding proceeding with the surgery, and the factors 
that went into Dr. Olsen recommending the surgery. 
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs Motion 
in Limine Re: Consent, and it did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony and admitting 
evidence regarding plaintiffs informed consent to the surgery. Further, plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate thattestimony regarding informed consent or admission of the consent forms denied 
him his substantial rights. Therefore, the district court's decision to allow testimony and evidence 
regarding plaintiffs informed consent to surgery should be affirmed. 
E. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Plaintiffs Motion In 
Limine Re: "Known Complications," or In Allowing Testimony Re: "Known 
Complications" Of Plaintiff's Surgery. 
As described above, a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence, including expert 
witness testimony, is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, as is a district court's ruling 
on a motion in limine. Morris ex rel. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,937 P.2d 1212 (1997); 
Puckettv. Verska, 144 Idaho 161,158 P.3d 937 (2007). 
Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in denying his Motion in Limine Re: Known 
Complications and in allowing Dr. Olsen and his expert witnesses to testify that damage to the 
phrenic nerve is a known risk of the type of surgery performed by Dr. Olsen. Plaintiff argues that 
Dr. Olsen was required to present evidence in the form of medical literature, medical journals, or 
medical treatises to provide adequate foundation for such testimony. (Appellant's Brief, p. 36.) This 
argument is misplaced. 
Questions of the admissibility of evidence are to be .determined by the district court and it is 
within the discretion of the district court to determine whether a proper foundation has been laid for 
the admission of expert testimony. Idaho R. Evid. 104(a); Swallow v. Emergency Med Of Idaho, 138 
Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003) (holding that the determination of whether expert testimony is 
supported by a proper foundation, whether an expert is qualified, and whether there is a scientific 
basis for the expert's opinion are all decisions committed to the sound discretion of the trial court); 
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'! Med Ctr, 134 Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d 816, 820-21 (2000). 
Plaintiff attempts to support his argument based on Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); however, Idaho has not adopted the Daubert standard 
for admissibility of expert testimony. See Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 595 
n. !, 67 P.3d 68, 74 (2003). Rather, the admissibility of expert witness testimony in the form of 
medical opinions requires that the expert's opinion meet the requirements ofldaho R. Evid. 702 and 
be based upon "a reasonable degree of medical probability." Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., Inc., 124 
Idaho 946, 948, 866 P .2d 969, 971 ( 1993 ). 
Idaho R. Evid. 702 provides the appropriate test for measuring the scientific reliability of 
expert testimony. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992). That Rule 
provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Idaho R. Evict. 702. 
As the Court has explained, "( w ]hen an 'expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, 
there must likewise be a scientific basis for that opinion' because if the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinions would not assist a trier of fact." 
Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, _, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007)(quoting 
Swallow v. Emergency 111/ed of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003)). 
In this case, Dr. Olsen and Dr. Olsen's expert witnesses testified that damage to the phrenic 
nerve was a known risk of the at-issue surgery: Dr. Wood testified that damage to the phrenic nerve 
was a known risk of the at-issue surgery (Tr. Vol. I, p. 766, II. 13-25 - p. 767, II. 1-7), as did Dr. 
Symmonds (Tr. Vol. I, p.825, II. 19-25-p. 826, II. 1-4), and Dr. Olsen (Tr. Vol. I, p. 766, IL 13-25-
p.767, II. 1-7.) Dr. Orme, a treating physician, also testified that damage to the phrenic nerve was a 
known risk of the at-issue surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 792, II. 9-25 -p. 793, II. 1-3.) The testimony of 
each of these physicians was based upon scientific knowledge, many years of experience in thoracic 
surgery, and experience and familiarity with the phrenic nerve in the context of thoracic surgery. 
Therefore, proper foundation existed for such testimony. 
Further, proper foundation existed for this testimony since it assisted the triers of fact in 
determining facts in issue and in interpreting evidence. Dr. Shuman testified that damage to the 
phrenic nerve is not a known complication of the at-issue surgery. (Tr. Vol. I., p. 328, II. 1-13.) 
After Dr. Shuman made this assertion, the testimony of Dr. Olsen, Dr. Wood, Dr. Symmonds, and 
Dr. Orme assisted jurors in determining whether injury to the phrenic nerve is, in fact, a known 
complication or· known risk of the type of surgery performed by Dr. Olsen. Therefore, proper 
foundation was laid for this testimony. For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth below, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such testimony and the decision of the district 
court to allow such testimony should be affirmed. 
1. The testimony of Dr. Wood was supported by adequate foundation. 
The evidence at trial established that Dr. Wood is an experienced thoracic surgeon and video-
assisted thoracic surgeon who was qualified to testify that damage to the phrenic nerve is a known 
risk of the at-issue surgery. Dr. Wood testified that he performs approximately 450 operations 
annually within his specialty of thoracic surgery, approximately 100 of which are video-assisted 
thoracic surgery (Tr. Vol. I, p. 966, ll. 1-25.) Further, Dr. Wood testified that he is a full professor of 
surgery at the University of Washington Medical Center. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 950, ll. 21-24.) As a 
professor of surgery, Dr. Wood testified that he teaches residents who are being trained in thoracic 
surgery that injury to the phrenic nerve is a common risk of thoracic procedures. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 971, 
II. 6-15.) Dr. Wood also testified that he is responsible for credentialing and examining thoracic 
surgeons as part of his position with the American Board of Thoracic Surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 971, ll. 
21-24.) According to Dr. Wood, an examinee would potentially fail his or her board examination if 
he or she contended that the phrenic nerve was not a structure at risk for injury during a thoracic 
procedure. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 972, ll. 2-7.) After providing this testimony, Dr. Wood testified as to his 
opinion that "Phrenic nerve injury is definitely a known complication of operations-any operations 
that occur in the vicinity of the phrenic nerve." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 970, II. 16-18.) Dr. Wood testified 
that his conclusions with respect to the at-issue surgery were based upon reasonable medical 
certainty. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 969, ll. 15-l 7.) 
In addition to his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education in the field of 
thoracic surgery, Dr. Wood relied upon medical literature in support of his opinions. Plaintiff 
contends, "Dr. Wood could not cite one authoritative treatise, textbook or article which supported his 
bold conclusion that injury to the phrenic nerve during this surgery is a known complication." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 33.) This statement is grossly inaccurate, however, as Dr. Wood relied upon 
articles and case reports to support his conclusion that injury to the phrenic nerve is a known 
complication of plaintiffs surgery. Although this medical literature does not provide in the 
following words, "injury to the phrenic nerve is a known complication ofpericardial cyst surgery," 
according to Dr. Wood's testimony, the literature upon which he relied supported his opinion that 
injury to the phrenic nerve is a known complication of surgeries very similar to plaintiff's pericardia! 
cyst removal surgery. 
During trial, plaintiff's counsel went through every article, abstract, and case report that Dr. 
Wood believed supported his opinion that a phrenic nerve injury is a known complication of the at-
issue surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1036-1063.) For example, Dr. ·wood relied upon, and brought to trial, a 
case report entitled, "Resection of a symptomatic pericardia! cyst using a computer-enhanced 
DaVinci surgical system." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1037, II. 12-15.) Although Dr. Wood admitted that the 
article did not directly discuss injury to the phrenic nerve as a risk of pericardia! cyst removal 
procedures, Dr. Wood explained, "[l]n this case report of one case, there was not a phrenic nerve 
injury, but they made very extensive care to emphasize the importance of the phrenic nerve in 
pericardia! cyst surgery. So that shows that the physicians doing that recognized that phrenic nerve 
injury was a concern in pericardia! cyst excision." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1037, ll. 22-25 - p. 1038, II. 1-3.) 
In addition, Dr. Wood relied upon, and brought to trial, an article entitled, "Video-Assisted 
Thoracoscopic Thymectomy for Myasthenia Gravis," published in the Internal Medicine Journal in 
2002. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1042, ll. 9-11.) According to Dr. Wood, the thymus, which is the focus of that 
article, is in the same location that plaintiffs pericardia! cyst was located. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1042, II. 18-
21.) According to Dr. Wood, that article discussed that cautery resulted in injury to the phrenic 
nerve during a thymectomy. (Tr. Vol. I, p. I 043, ll. 4-8.) Further, Dr. Wood relied upon an article 
entitled, "Postoperative Phrenic Nerve Palsy, Early Clinical Implications and Management," which, 
according to Dr. Wood, examined phrenic nerve injury following cardiothoracic surgery in children. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 1049, ll. 5-13.) 
Finally, in addition to his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education in the 
discipline of thoracic surgery, and in addition to medical literature, Dr. Wood relied upon a video 
used in Dr. Shurilan's testimony (plaintiffs illustrative Exhibit 8A) to assist jurors in understanding 
the procedure employed by thoracic surgeons in identifying and protecting the phrenic nerve. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 982, l. 25 - p. 9871. 20.) In relying on this video, Dr. Wood demonstrated for the jury how 
the very video Dr. Shuman used to demonstrate how this type of surgery is performed showed the 
close proximity of the phrenic nerve in a surgery such as the at-issue surgery and the potential for 
harm to the phrenic nerve. In discussing the video, Dr. Wood testified: 
This structure right along here is the phrenic nerve, along the edge of 
that cyst. It's this line that you see, a fairly thin line right along here. 
And you can see that it's adjacent to that. 
And although the surgeons have identified it and are being careful 
with it, you can see, here is the nerve that's exposed right behind this. 
You can see it is being pulled and pushed as part of the process of 
separating the cyst from the nerve. So the nerve stays behind, and 
hopefully functional, but the cyst in this case being removed. 
And this shows the instrumentation right along the nerve. It's 
immediately adjacent to it. And that's very common for not just this 
procedure, but for any cyst or tumor or related structure that's in this 
vicinity, which is - this is very comparable to the type of surgery that 
Dr. Olsen did. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 984, ll. 17-25 - p. 985, ll. 1-11.) Because Dr. Wood's use of this video assisted the 
trier of fact in determining facts in issue and in understanding evidence, Dr. Wood's testimony was 
supported by proper foundation. 
In summary, because Dr. Wood's testimony assisted the trier of fact in determining a fact in 
issue, and beca.use Dr. Wood's testimony was based upon "a reasonable. degree of medical 
probability," proper foundation was laid for Dr. Wood's testimony that injury to the phrenic nerve 
was a known complication of the plaintiffs surgery, as required by Idaho R. Evid., 702. Therefore, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. 
2. The testimony of Dr. Olsen was supported by adequate foundation. 
Dr. Olsen, a thoracic surgeon, testified that injury to the phrenic nerve was a known 
complication of plaintiffs surgery: 
Q. . .. Do you have an opinion as to whether injury to the phrenic 
nerve would be a known risk of this procedure? 
A. Yes, I do. 
A. Anytime your operating near the phrenic nerve -
MR. SCHLENDER: Objection, Your Honor. He asked about this 
procedure, not "anywhere near the phrenic nerve." 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. MR. HALL: Go ahead. 
A. I knew I was going to be operating near the phrenic nerve, within 
perhaps even millimeters of it. And so yes, there was most definitely 
a.risk of injury to the phrenic nerve. 
(Tr. Vol. I,p. 766, ll. 17-25-p. 767, II. 1-7.) 
Dr. Olsen testified that he has been practicing as a thoracic surgeon in Boise, Idaho since 
1988 (Tr. Vol. I, p.722, ll. 16-20), and that he performed 1200 to 1300 Video Assisted 
Thoracoscopic procedures prior to performing plaintiffs thoracoscopic surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 732, 
11. 2-5 .) Despite the extraordinary rarity of pericardia! cysts, Dr. Olsen testified that he has operated 
on five or six pericardia! cysts. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 732, ll. 21-25-p. 733, ll. 1-7.) 
Because Dr. Olsen's testimony assisted the triers of fact in determining a fact in issue, and 
because Dr. Olsen's testimony was based upon "a reasonable degree of medical probability," proper 
foundation was laid for Dr. Olsen's testimony that injury to the phrenic nerve is a known 
complication ofthe at-issue surgery, as required by Idaho R. of Evid. 702. Therefore, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. 
3. The testimony of Dr. Symmonds was supported by adequate foundation. 
Dr. Symmonds, a thoracic and vascular surgeon who has practiced in Boise, Idaho since 
1987, also testified at trial. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 818, II. 15-25 - p. 819, II. 1-2.) Dr. Symmonds testified 
that he has performed "a thousand or perhaps a couple thousand" chest operations in his years of 
practice. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 820, II. 1-6.) During the direct examination of Dr. Symmonds, counsel for 
Dr. Olsen asked: 
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not, in the performance 
of a thoracoscopic mediastinal procedure, the phrenic nerve would 
constitute a known or common risk of the procedure? 
A: Especially with a cyst in this position, the phrenic nerve is 
immediately adjacent to the cyst, and it is at risk, yes. 
Q: And you're referring to this specific procedure? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 825, II. 19-25 - p. 826, II. 1-4.) Dr. Symmonds also testified as to his opinion that Dr. 
Olsen met the standard of care in identifying the phrenic nerve, and that his opinion was based upon 
reasonable medical certainty. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 823, II. 21-25 - p. 824, II. 1-9.) 
Because Dr. Symmond's testimony assisted the triers of fact in determining a fact in issue, 
and because Dr. Symmond's testimony was based upon "a reasonable degree of medical 
probability," proper foundation was laid for Dr. Symmond's testimony that injury to the phrenic 
nerve is a risk of the at-issue surgery, as required by Idaho R. Evid. 702. Therefore, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. 
4. The testimony of Dr. Orme was supported by adequate foundation. 
Dr. Orme, a cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon who assisted in plaintiffs surgery, also 
testified at trial on behalf of Dr. Olsen. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 788.) Dr. Orme testified that he completed his 
training in general thoracic surgery and cardiac surgery in 1973, and that he has performed 
approximately 2000 open heart surgeries in his lifetime (Tr. Vol. I, p. 789, II. 4-23.) Dr. Olsen's 
counsel asked Dr. Orme to describe the risks associated with plaintiffs surgery: 
Q: What risks were you aware of? 
A: Well, in a surgery like this, there's always a risk of bleeding from 
the entry wounds into the chest wall. There's the risk.of infection 
occurring in the plural space, the space between the lung and the 
chest wall. And there could be a risk of nerve injury. 
Q: What nerve? 
A. The phrenic nerve particularly. 
Q. And why is that a risk? 
A. Because of its course in the chest. It travels from the neck down 
along the carotid artery and over the arch of the aorta, and then runs 
along the pericardium, the covering of the heart. And it runs from 
along the pericardium down to the diaphragm. And so this phrenic 
nerve is in a region where the cyst was in this case, so it could be 
something that one would look out for. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 792, II. 18-25-p. 793, IL 1-13.) 
Dr. Orme then testified that Dr. Olsen identified the phrenic nerve during plaintiffs 
surgery and, therefore, complied with the applicable standard of care. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 794, 11. 20-
25 p. 795, ll. 1-16.) 
Because Dr. Orme's testimony assisted the triers of fact in determining a fact in issue, and 
because Dr. Orme's testimony was based upon "a reasonable degree of medical probability," proper 
foundation was laid for Dr. Orme's testimony that injury to the phrenic nerve is a known 
complication of the at-issue surgery. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing this testimony. 
5. Foundation for the testimony of Dr. Olsen and his expert witnesses did not require 
reliance upon medical literature. 
Plaintiff contends the testimony of Dr. Olsen's expert witnesses lacked foundation because 
these witnesses did not cite to a treatise, textbook, or article that specifically stated that injury to the 
phrenic nerve is a known complication to pericardia! cyst removal surgery. First, as described 
above, foundation for expert witness medical opinion testimony merely requires that the testimony 
be based upon a reasonable degree of medical probability. Roberts, 124 Idaho at 948,866 P.2d at 
971. It does not require that such testimony be supported by treatises, textbooks, or articles. As 
described above, because the testimony of Dr. Olsen, Dr. Symmonds, Dr. Wood, and Dr. Orme was 
based upon their knowledge, skill, experience, training and education in thoracic surgery, their 
respective testimony that damage to the phrenic nerve was a known complication of the at-issue 
surgery met the requirements of Idaho R. Evid. 702 and was supported by adequate foundation. 
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such testimony. 
Second, pericardia! cysts are so rare that no treatise, textbook, or article exists which 
specifically provides that injury to the phrenic nerve is a known complication of pericardia! cyst 
removal surgery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 972, II. 19-25-p. 973, II. 1-10.) As Dr. Wood clarified, "Pericardia! 
cysts are unusual, and therefore there are not papers written specifically about pericardia! cysts .... So 
it is artificial to look for a specific pericardia! cyst/phrenic nerve injury paper, because I doubt it 
would exist. It's just, there's not articles about pericardia! cysts period, except for individual case 
reports." (Id.) As Dr. Olsen testified, it is estimated that one out of every 100,000 individuals has a 
pericardia! cyst, making them "as rare as hens teeth." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 732, II. 23-25-p. 733, 11. 1-12.) 
Plaintiff relies upon the Court's decision in Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 
Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007) to suggest that expert medical opinion testimony be supported by 
treatises, textbooks, or articles. Weeks does not support such an argument. In Weeks, the Court held 
that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that plaintiffs' expert witness was not qualified to 
testify regarding causation and in subsequently excluding his opinion testimony regarding the cause 
of plaintiff's brain injury. Id. at_, 153 P.3d at 1183. In that case, physicians placed a catheter in 
the decedent's head to drain fluid buildup around her brain as a result of a brain hemorrhage and 
hematoma. Id. at _, 153 P .3d at 1182. An attending nurse later discovered that a mixture of 
several chemicals, which were intended to be injected into the decedent intravenously, were instead 
erroneously injected directly into the catheter placed in decedent's head. Id. Among these 
chemicals were dopamine and amiodarone. Id. 
Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the infusion was a substantial factor in causing 
decedent's death; however, the expert testified that he was not certain whether the decedent's death 
was due to the chemicals contained in the infusion, the volume of fluid, or the combination of both. 
Id. at_, 153 P.3d at 1185. Specifically, plaintiffs' expert testified that "no research has been done 
based upon this exact type of occurrence, and the effects of administering dopamine and amiodarone 
directly into the central nervous systems of humans or animals have never been studied." Id. 
Despite the lack of research on this specific issue, plaintiffs' expert witness was clear that, regardless 
of the lack ofresearch, the infusion of fluid into the decedent's brain contributed to her death. Id. 
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that 
plaintiffs' expert was not competent to testify regarding causation because his testimony was not 
based upon sound scientific principles. Id. The Supreme Court ofldaho reversed the district court's 
ruling, however, explaining that the opinion of plaintiffs' expert witness was not based on 
speculation, but instead was based on scientifically reliable principles supported by the expert's 
experience and. research. Id. Although there was no peer-reviewed published information 
addressing the precise medical issue presented in Weeks, the Court recognized, "in instances of a rare 
occurrence where there are few opportunities for scholarly research, the lack of published studies 
should not bar otherwise scientifically valid testimony." Id. 
Here, as in Weeks, although there appeared to be no peer-reviewed published information 
specifically providing that injury to the phrenic nerve is a known complication of pericardial cyst 
removal surgery, reliance upon medical literature addressing this rare surgery was not a foundational 
requirement for the testimony of Dr. Olsen, his expert witnesses and Dr. Orme. In Weeks, the 
testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness was based, in part, upon his experience. Similarly, in this 
case, the testimony of Dr. Olsen and his expert witnesses was based upon their education, training, 
their many years of practice and experience in thoracic surgery, and their training and experience in 
identifying and protecting the phrenic nerve to prevent injury while performing thoracic surgeries. 
Further, the testimony by Dr. Olsen, his expert witnesses, and Dr. Orme that injury to the phrenic 
nerve was a known complication of plaintiffs surgery was useful to jurors in determining a fact in 
issue and interpreting evidence as required by Idaho R. Evid. 702. Therefore, in accordance with 
Weeks, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony that injury to the phrenic 
nerve was a known complication of plaintiffs surgery. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As described above, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion 
as to any of its rulings or decisions. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the decisions of the 
district court should be affirmed. 
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